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Multipartite entangled states are a fundamental resource for a wide range of quantum
information processing tasks. In particular, in quantum networks, it is essential for the parties
involved to be able to verify if entanglement is present before they carry out a given
distributed task. Here we design and experimentally demonstrate a protocol that allows any
party in a network to check if a source is distributing a genuinely multipartite entangled state,
even in the presence of untrusted parties. The protocol remains secure against dishonest
behaviour of the source and other parties, including the use of system imperfections to their
advantage. We demonstrate the verification protocol in a three- and four-party setting using
polarization-entangled photons, highlighting its potential for realistic photonic quantum
communication and networking applications.
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E
ntanglement plays a key role in the study and development
of quantum information theory and is a vital component
in quantum networks1–5. The advantage provided by
entangled states can be observed, for example, when the
quantum correlations of the n-party Greenberger–Horne–
Zeilinger (GHZ) state6 are used to win a nonlocal game with
probability 1, while any classical local theory can win the
game with probability at most 3/4 (see ref. 7). In a more
general setting, multipartite entangled states allow the parties
in a network to perform distributed tasks that outperform their
classical counterparts8, to delegate quantum computation to
untrusted servers9, or to compute through the measurement-
based quantum computation model10. It is therefore vital for
parties in a quantum network to be able to verify that a state is
entangled, especially in the presence of untrusted parties and by
performing only local operations and classical communication.
A protocol for verifying that an untrusted source creates
and shares the n-qubit multipartite entangled GHZ state,
GHZnj i ¼ 1ffiffi2p 0j i nþ 1j i n
 
, with n parties has recently been
proposed11. In the verification protocol, the goal of the honest
parties is to determine how close the state they share is to the
ideal GHZ state and verify whether or not it contains genuine
multipartite entanglement (GME)—entanglement that can only
exist if all qubits were involved in the creation of the state1.
On the other hand, any number of dishonest parties that may
collaborate with the untrusted source are trying to ‘cheat’ by
convincing the honest parties that the state they share is close to
the ideal GHZ state and contains GME when this may not be the
case. Verifying GME in multipartite GHZ states in this way is
relevant to a wide variety of protocols in distributed quantum
computation and quantum communication. While distributed
quantum computation is at an early stage of development
experimentally12–14, many schemes for using multipartite GHZ
states in distributed quantum communication have already been
demonstrated, including quantum secret sharing15, open-
destination teleportation16 and multiparty quantum
key distribution17,18. This makes the entanglement verification
protocol relevant for distributed quantum communication with
present technology.
In order for a quantum protocol to be practical, however, it
must take into account system imperfections, including loss and
noise, throughout the protocol (generation, transmission
and detection of the quantum state). In the previous work11, it
was shown that by using a suitable protocol, the closeness of a
shared resource state to a GHZ state and the presence of GME
can be verified in a distributed way between untrusted parties
under perfect experimental conditions. However, the protocol is
not tolerant to arbitrary loss and in fact it cannot be used for a
loss rate that exceeds 50%.
In this work, we design and experimentally demonstrate a
protocol that outperforms the original one in ref. 11. We
examine quantitatively how a dishonest party can use system
imperfections to boost their chances of cheating and show our
protocol defends against such tactics. We demonstrate both
the original and new protocols using a source of
polarization-entangled photons, which produces three- and
four-party GHZ states, and examine the performance of the
protocols under realistic experimental conditions. Our results are
perfectly adapted to photonic quantum networks and can be
used to reliably verify multipartite entanglement in a real-world
quantum communication setting. To achieve verification of a
state in an untrusted setting, the protocols exploit the capability
of GHZ states to produce extremal correlations, which are
unobtainable by any quantum state that is not locally equivalent
to the GHZ state. This property has been shown
to bound state fidelities in the fully device-independent setting
of nonlocality via self-testing19–21. In addition, a related
recent study22 has proposed a method to detect multipartite
entanglement in the ‘steering’ setting, in which some of the
devices are known to be untrusted (or defective), by using
one-sided device-independent entanglement witnesses. Our
protocols extend beyond these methods by allowing the amount
of entanglement to be quantified in terms of an appropriate
fidelity measure in a setting where some unknown parties are
untrusted, as well as providing a method for dealing with loss
and other inefficiencies in the system. This makes our protocols
and analysis more appropriate for a realistic network setting.
Results
The verification protocol. The network scenario we consider
consists of a source that shares an n-qubit state r with n parties,
where each party receives a qubit. One of the parties, a
‘Verifier’, would like to verify how close this shared state is to
the ideal state and whether or not it contains GME. The
protocol to do this is as follows: first, the Verifier generates
random angles yjA[0,p) for all parties including themselves
(jA[n]), such that
P
jyj is a multiple of p. The angles are then sent
out to all the parties in the network. When party j receives
their angle from the Verifier, they measure in the basis
fjþ yji; j  yjig ¼ f 1ffiffi2p 0j i þ eiyj 1j i
 
; 1ffiffi
2
p 0j i  eiyj 1j i
 
g and send
the outcome Yj¼ {0, 1} to the Verifier. A flow diagram of the
protocol is shown in Fig. 1a, where the order in which the angles
are sent out and outcomes returned is irrelevant and it is assumed
that the Verifier and each of the parties share a secure private
channel for the communication. This can be achieved by using
either a one-time pad or quantum key distribution3, making the
communication secure even in the presence of a quantum
computer. The state passes the test when the following condition
is satisfied: if the sum of the randomly chosen angles is an even
multiple of p, there must be an even number of 1 outcomes for Yj,
and if the sum is an odd multiple of p, there must be an odd
number of 1 outcomes for Yj. We can write this condition as
 jYj ¼
1
p
X
j
yj ðmod 2Þ: ð1Þ
For an ideal n-qubit GHZ state, the test succeeds with probability
1 (see Supplementary Note 1). Moreover, it can be shown that the
fidelity F(r)¼hGHZn|r|GHZni of a shared state r with respect to
an ideal GHZ state can be lower bounded by a function of the
probability of the state passing the test, P(r). If we first suppose
that all n parties are honest, then F(r)Z2P(r) 1 (see
Supplementary Note 1). Furthermore, we can say that GME is
present for a state r when F(r)41/2 with respect to an ideal GHZ
state23, and therefore GME can be verified when the pass
probability is P(r)43/4. This verification protocol, that we will
call the ‘y-protocol’, is a generalization of the protocol in ref. 11,
called the ‘XY-protocol’, where the angles yj are fixed as either 0
or p/2, corresponding to measurements in the Pauli X or Y basis.
In the honest case and under ideal conditions, the lower bound
for the fidelity is the same in both protocols.
When the Verifier runs the test in the presence of n k
dishonest parties, the dishonest parties can always collaborate
and apply a local or joint operation U to their part of the
state. This encompasses the different ways in which the
dishonest parties may try to cheat in the most general
setting. Hence, we look at a fidelity measure given by
F0ðrÞ ¼ maxU Fð Ik  Un kð ÞrðIk  Uwn kÞÞ, and lower bound
it by the pass probability as F 0(r)Z4P(r) 3 for both the y and
XY protocols (see Supplementary Note 1). This gives directly a
bound of P(r)47/8¼ 0.875 to observe GME. However, by
concentrating on attacks for the case F0(r)¼ 1/2, tighter analysis
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can be performed (see Supplementary Note 1), where the
GME bound can be shown to be P(r)Z1/2þ 1/pE0.818 for
the y-protocol and P(r)Zcos2(p/8)E0.854 for the XY protocol.
The y-protocol is more sensitive to detecting cheating and
hence can be used to verify GME more broadly in realistic
implementations where the resources are not ideal.
The above bounds do not account for loss. To analyse cheating
strategies, which take advantage of loss, we must allow the
dishonest parties (which have potentially perfect control of the
source and their equipment) to choose to declare ‘loss’ at any
point. In particular, they may do this when they are asked to
make measurements that would reduce the probability of success,
making the round invalid, which can skew the statistics in favour
of passing to the advantage of the dishonest parties. This may
change the fidelity and GME bounds above. We address this to
find GME bounds in the case of loss in our photonic realization.
Experimental setup. The optical setup used to perform the
verification protocols is shown in Fig. 1b. The source of GHZ
states consists of two micro-structured photonic crystal fibres
(PCFs), each of which produces a photon pair by spontaneous
four-wave mixing, with the signal wavelength at 623 nm and the
idler at 871 nm (see Supplementary Note 2). To generate
entangled pairs of photons, each fibre loop is placed in a Sagnac
configuration, where it is pumped in both directions. When the
pump pulse entering the Sagnac loop is in diagonal polarization,
conditional on a single pair being generated by the pump laser,
the state exiting the polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) of the loop is in
the Bell state 1ffiffi
2
p Hj is Hj iiþ Vj is Vj ii
 
, with s and i indicating the
signal and idler photons, respectively24,25. The signal and idler
photons of each source are then separated into individual spatial
modes by dichroic mirrors, after which the two signal photons are
overlapped at a PBS that performs a parity check, or ‘fusion’
operation26,27. We postselect with 50% probability the detection
outcomes in which one signal photon emerges from each output
mode of the PBS, which projects the state onto the four-photon
GHZ state
1ffiffi
2
p Hj ii1 Hj is1 Hj is2 Hj ii2 þ Vj ii1 Vj is1 Vj is2 Vj ii2
 
: ð2Þ
All four photons are then coupled into single-mode fibres, which
take them to measurement stages representing the parties in the
network. With appropriate angle choices of the wave plates
included in these stages, any projective measurement can be
made by the parties on the polarization state of their photon28.
In our experiment, the successful generation of the state is
conditional on the detection of four photons in separate modes,
that is, postselected. In principle, it is possible to move
beyond postselection in our setup, where the GHZ states are
generated deterministically. This can be achieved by the
addition of a quantum non-demolition measurement of the
photon number in the modes after the fusion operation. While
technically challenging, quantum non-demolition measurements
are possible for photons, for instance as theoretically shown29,30
and experimentally demonstrated31. By using postselection,
we are able to give a proof-of-principle demonstration of
the protocols and gain important information about their
performance in such a scenario, including the impact of loss.
In our experiments, we use both a three- and a four-photon
GHZ state. The generation of the three-photon state requires
only a slight modification to the setup, with one of the PCFs
pumped in just one direction to generate unentangled pairs
(see Supplementary Note 2). Before carrying out the verification
protocols, we first characterize our experimental GHZ states by
performing quantum state tomography28. The resulting density
matrices for the three- and four-photon GHZ states are shown in
Fig. 2 and have corresponding fidelities FGHZ3 ¼ 0:80  0:01
and FGHZ4 ¼ 0:70  0:01 with respect to the ideal states.
These fidelities compare well with other recent experiments
using photons (see Table 1) and are limited mainly by
dephasing from the fusion operation26 and higher-order
emission (see Supplementary Note 2). The errors have been
calculated using maximum likelihood estimation and a Monte
Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the count statistics, which
is the dominant source of error in our photonic experiment28.
Entanglement verification. To demonstrate the verification of
multipartite entanglement, we use the polarization degree
of freedom of the photons generated in our optical setup.
The computational basis states sent out to the parties are
therefore defined as |0i¼ |Hi and |1i¼ |Vi for a given photon.
Furthermore, the verification protocol relies on a randomly
selected set of angles being distributed by the Verifier for each
state being tested. To ensure dishonest parties have no prior
knowledge, the set of angles is changed after every detection
of a copy of the state, that is, we perform single-shot
measurements in our experiment. To achieve this, we use
automated wave-plate rotators to change the measurement basis
defined by the randomized angles for each state. The rotators are
controlled by a computer with access to the incoming coincidence
data. This approach is needed to provide a faithful demonstration
of the protocol and is technologically more advanced than the
usual method used in photonic quantum information
experiments, where many detections are accumulated over a fixed
integration time for a given measurement basis and properties
then inferred from the ensemble of states. We now analyse
the performance of the XY and y verification protocols for the
three- and four-party GHZ states.
Verification of three-party GHZ. The XY verification protocol
was initially carried out using the three-photon GHZ state, with
all parties behaving honestly. The first two angles yj were
randomly chosen to be either 0 or p/2, with the third angle
representing the Verifier being decided so that
P
jyj is a multiple
of p. After repeating the protocol on 6,000 copies of the state, the
pass probability was found to be 0.838±0.005. Similarly, the
y-protocol was carried out, with the first two angles chosen
uniformly at random from the continuous range [0,p). After
6,000 copies of the state were prepared and measured, the pass
probability was found to be 0.834±0.005.
Using the relation between the fidelity and the pass probability,
F(r)Z2P(r) 1, the Verifier can conclude that the fidelity with
respect to an ideal GHZ state is at least 0.676±0.010 for the
XY-protocol and at least 0.668±0.010 for the y-protocol. These
values are consistent with the value obtained using state
tomography. Despite the non-ideal experimental resource, the
lower bound on the fidelity is clearly above 1/2 and therefore
sufficient for the Verifier to verify GME in this all honest case.
More importantly, the y-protocol enables the Verifier to verify
GME even when they do not trust all of the parties. Indeed, the
experimental value of the pass probability, 0.834, exceeds by more
than 3 s.d. the GME bound of 0.818 for the dishonest case. We
remark that for verifying GME in these conditions, we crucially used
the fact that our three-qubit GHZ state has very high fidelity and that
the y-protocol has improved tolerance to noise. In fact, the Verifier is
not able to verify GME using the XY-protocol, since the experimental
value of 0.838 does not exceed the GME bound of 0.854.
Theoretical verification of three-party GHZ with losses.
We now investigate the impact of loss on the performance
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of the verification protocols. In this setting, the Verifier
is willing to accept up to a certain loss rate from each party.
When a party declares loss, the specific run of the
protocol is aborted and the Verifier moves on to testing
the next copy of the resource state. A dishonest party,
who may not have the maximum allowed loss rate in their system,
or may even have no loss at all, can increase the overall
pass probability of the state by declaring loss whenever the
probability to pass a specific measurement request from the
Verifier is low.
Verification protocol
a
b
Pass condition
State preparation
Sagnac
PCF
PBS
DM
DM
PBS
PBS
ΔT
PCF
SB
Pump @ 726 nm
Idler @ 871 nm
Signal@ 623 nm
HWP
Ti-Saph
HWP
BS
Source 1
Sagnac
Source 2
Pass
Party j
Party 1
Party 2
Party 3
Party 4
PBS
HWP
QWP
PBS
HWP
QWP
PBS
HWP
QWP
PBS
HWP
QWP
Repeat for parties 2 to n
Fail
Loss
Party 1 measures in
basis {⎥ +1〉 , ⎥ –1〉} &
returns outcome Y1
Verifier sends
1 to party 1
Verifier checks
condition
Verifier writes
to memory
Verifier chooses j 
for party j such that
∑ j = 0   (mod )
j
Yj = 
1
 ∑ j   (mod 2)jj
j
⎥ + 〉
⎥ + 〉 ⎥ – 〉
⎥ – 〉
⎥ H 〉
⎥ V 〉
⎥ V 〉
⎥ H 〉
⎥ + 〉 ⎥ – 〉
⎥ V 〉
⎥ H 〉
⎥ + 〉 ⎥ – 〉
⎥ V 〉
⎥ H 〉
⎥ + 〉 ⎥ – 〉
⎥ V 〉
⎥ H 〉
i1
s1
s2
i2
Figure 1 | The verification protocol and experimental setup. (a) A flow diagram showing the steps of the verification protocol. (b) The experimental setup
for state preparation, consisting of a femto-second laser (Spectra-Physics Tsunami) filtered to give 1.7 nm bandwidth pulses at 726 nm. The laser beam is
split by a beamsplitter into two modes with the polarization set to diagonal by half-wave plates. One mode undergoes a temporal offset, DT, using a
translation stage and the other a phase rotation using a Soleil–Babinet compensator. The modes each enter a PCF source via a PBS in a Sagnac
configuration, enabling pumping in both directions. The sources generate non-degenerate entangled signal and idler photon pairs by spontaneous
four-wave mixing. Temperature tuning in one of the sources is used to match the spectra of the resulting signal photons in the other source. The entangled
photon pairs exit the sources via the PBS and due to their non-degenerate wavelengths they are separated by dichroic mirrors and filtered with Dls¼40 nm
at ls¼623 nm (tunable Dli¼ 2 nm at li¼ 871 nm) in the signal (idler) to remove any remaining light from the pump laser. The signal photons from each
pair interfere at a PBS and all photons are collected into single-mode fibres. Pairs of automated half- and quarter-wave plates on each of the four output
modes from the fibres allow arbitrary rotations to be made before the modes are split by PBSs and the light is detected by eight silicon avalanche
photodiode detectors. The protocol’s software (outlined in panel (a)) is linked to an eight-channel coincidence counting box (Qumet MT-30A) and the
automated wave plates to set each unique measurement basis for the parties and detect single-shot four-fold coincidences.
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For example, a non-GME state can have pass probability 1 for
the XY-protocol when the allowed loss rate is 50%. In this case, the
source can share a state of the form 1ffiffi
2
p HHj i þ VVj ið Þ  þj i,
where the third qubit is sent to a dishonest party. Then, when the
latter is asked to measure in the Pauli X basis, the party always
answers correctly; while when asked to measure in the Pauli Y
basis, it declares loss. Of course, such a strategy would alert the
Verifier that the party is cheating, since the party is always
declaring loss when asked to measure in the Y basis, while when
asked to measure in the X basis, the party always measures the
|þi eigenstate. However, if the source and the dishonest
party are collaborating, and the source is able to create and
share any Bell pair with the two honest parties, then the test
can be passed each time without the cheating detected. The
dishonest strategy would go as follows: the source sends randomly
one of the four states f 1ffiffi
2
p HHj i þ VVj ið Þ; 1ffiffi
2
p HHj i  VVj ið Þ;
1ffiffi
2
p HHj i þ i VVj ið Þ; 1ffiffi
2
p HHj i  i VVj ið Þg and tells the dishonest
party which one was sent, so that the latter can coordinate its
actions. For the first state, the party replies 0 only for the X basis;
for the second state, it replies 1 only for the X basis; for the third,
it replies 1 only for the Y basis; and for the fourth, it replies 0 only
for the Y basis.
More generally, we can analytically find the GME bound as a
function of the loss rate for both protocols and describe optimal
cheating strategies to achieve these bounds with non-GME states.
The optimal cheating strategy for the XY-protocol consists of the
source rotating the non-GME state that is sent to the honest
parties in a specific way depending on the amount of loss
allowed, and informing the dishonest party about the rotation.
For zero loss, the optimal state is the p/4-rotated Bell pair
1ffiffi
2
p ð HHj i þ ei
p
4 VVj iÞ, while for 50% loss, the optimal state is
the Bell pair 1ffiffi
2
p HHj i þ VVj ið Þ. For any loss, l, in between, the
dishonest strategy is a probabilistic mixture of these two
strategies; it consists of sending the Bell pair with probability
2l (and discarding the rounds in which the dishonest party is
asked to measure Y), and the p/4-rotated Bell pair with
probability 1–2l. In both, the strategy mentioned in the previous
paragraph for avoiding detection of the dishonest party’s cheating
is required. On the other hand, the optimal strategy for the
y-protocol is having the source send a rotated Bell pair with
the dishonest party declaring loss for the angles that have the
lowest pass probability (see Supplementary Note 1).
The upper bounds of the pass probability for the optimal
cheating strategies using a non-GME state are shown as the solid
turquoise and purple upper curves in Fig. 3, for the XY and
y-protocol, respectively. Specifically for the case of no loss, we
recover the GME bounds of 0.854 and 0.818 for the XY- and
y-protocol, respectively. The GME bound for the XY-protocol
reaches 1 for 50% loss, while the GME bound for the y-protocol
reaches 1 only at 100% loss.
Experimental verification of three-party GHZ with losses. In
Fig. 3a, one can see the experimental value of 0.834±0.005 when
there is no loss for the y-protocol enables the Verifier to verify
GME in the presence of up to B5% loss—once the loss increases
past 5%, the Verifier can no longer guarantee the shared
experimental state has GME. Again, this loss tolerance is only
possible due to the high fidelity of our three-party GHZ state and
the fact that our y-protocol has a better behaviour with respect to
loss. The tolerance to loss can be further improved using
experimental states with higher fidelities. However, it is inter-
esting to note that 5% loss corresponds to B1 km of optical fibre,
which already makes the protocol relevant to a quantum network
within a small area, such as a city or government facility,
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Figure 2 | Tomographic reconstruction of the three- and four-photon GHZ states used in the protocols. (a) Three-photon GHZ state (left column) and
ideal case (right column). (b) Four-photon GHZ state (left column) and ideal case (right column). Top row corresponds to the real parts and bottom row
corresponds to the imaginary parts. The density matrix elements are given by rij¼hi|rexp|ji, where rexp is the reconstructed experimental density matrix.
Table 1 | Comparison of GHZ fidelities.
Three-photon GHZ fidelity Four-photon GHZ fidelity
F¼0.80±0.01, This work F¼0.70±0.01, This work
F¼0.768±0.015, K. Resch
et al.33
F¼0.840±0.007, Z. Zhao
et al.34
F¼0.74±0.01, X.-Q. Zhou
et al.35
F¼0.66±0.01, B. Bell
et al.27
F¼0.811±0.002, H.-X. Lu
et al.36
F¼0.833±0.004, X.-.L. Wang
et al.37
F¼0.93±0.01, R.B. Patel et al.38
The table shows the fidelity of recent three-photon and four-photon GHZ states from other
experiments, and includes the fidelities from this work (top row).
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where a number of quantum communication protocols
could be carried out over the network, such as, for instance
quantum secret sharing15, telecloning32 and open destination
teleportation16.
Implementation of dishonest strategies for three-party GHZ.
To maximize the pass probabilities of the protocols using a non-
GME state, the source needs to appropriately rotate the state that
is sent to the honest parties depending on the amount of loss
allowed. We implemented this strategy for a single dishonest
party by using a complementary method, where the source cre-
ates a three-qubit GHZ state and gets the dishonest party to
perform a projective measurement that creates the necessary
rotated non-GME state between the honest parties. This strategy
was performed experimentally for both protocols on 3,000 copies
of the three-qubit GHZ state. Since in our experiment, the GHZ
states are created by postselection, the loss corresponds to the
allowed percentage of tests in which the dishonest party can claim
they lost their qubit during transmission of the corresponding
photon from the source.
The pass probabilities are shown as a function of loss by the
solid turquoise and purple lower curves in Fig. 3a. They show the
same trend as the previous curves but are shifted lower due to the
non-ideal experimental state. For the no loss case, we obtain a
pass probability of 0.736±0.008 for the XY-protocol. For the
y-protocol, the pass probability depends on the dishonest party’s
measurement request y: for no loss, the experimental results are
shown in Fig. 3b, from which we obtain an average pass
probability of 0.699±0.009. When loss is included, the dishonest
party’s cheating strategy leads to a higher pass probability, since
the dishonest party claims loss when the angle given to him by
the Verifier is close to p/2, corresponding to the minimum
pass probability shown in Fig. 3b. Similar to the discussion in
the example of the XY-protocol, the source collaborates with
the dishonest party and applies a rotation to the shared state, so
that the declared lost angles appear uniform and not always
around p/2.
Verification of four-party GHZ. To check the performance of
the protocols for a higher number of parties, the verification tests
were carried out using the four-photon GHZ state generated in
our experiment, now with three angles chosen randomly, and the
fourth depending on the condition that
P
jyj is a multiple of p.
Again, we start with the all honest case where any of the parties
may be the Verifier. For the XY-protocol, with all yj equal to 0 or
p/2, the pass probability for 6,000 copies of the state was found to
be 0.776±0.005. For the y-protocol, using 6,000 copies, the pass
probability was found to be 0.767±0.005.
As in the three-party case, the Verifier can conclude that the
fidelity with respect to an ideal GHZ state is at least 0.552±0.010
for the XY-protocol and at least 0.534±0.010 for the y-protocol,
therefore just sufficient for the Verifier to verify that GME is
present in the state. Again, the high fidelity of our experimental
state is crucial for this result. Nevertheless, none of the two
protocols can confirm GME in the presence of dishonest parties
since the pass probabilities are below the GME bounds of 0.854
and 0.818, respectively.
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Figure 3 | Pass probabilities as a function of loss for one dishonest party in a three- and four-party setting. (a,b) correspond to the three-party setting,
and (c,d) correspond to the four-party setting. The upper curves in a and c show the ideal theoretical case for the GME bound for the y-protocol (purple
curve) and a cheating strategy for the XY-protocol (turquoise curve) that always performs better. Note that the XY-protocol cannot be used here for
verification as the non-GME dishonest value is always above the honest value. The lower solid curves in a and c correspond to the experimental results
obtained for the three- and four-photon GHZ state, respectively. In both panels, the dashed lines correspond to the honest experimental values when there
is no loss (turquoise for the XY-protocol and purple for the y-protocol). (a,c) clearly show that the y-protocol can tolerate loss ]0.5 in the ideal case. (b,d)
show the optimal pass probability that the dishonest party can obtain when running the y-protocol with no loss, for a given dishonest angle y, for the three-
party and four-party case, respectively. In all plots, the curves are a best fit to the data. All error bars represent the standard deviation and are calculated
using a Monte Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the count statistics28.
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Implementation of dishonest strategies for four-party GHZ.
The dishonest strategies that are used to implement the two
verification protocols for different amounts of loss are the same as
in the three-party case. However, we proceed in two different
ways for a single dishonest party. First, we have the source create
our non-ideal four-qubit GHZ state and then allow the dishonest
party to perform the dishonest projective measurement to create a
non-GME state. When there is no loss, we obtain a pass prob-
ability of 0.679±0.008 for the XY-protocol and 0.669±0.008 for
the y-protocol (averaged over the dishonest angle y, as shown in
the histogram of Fig. 3d). When loss is included, the pass prob-
abilities of both the XY- and y-protocols increase, as the dishonest
party uses the loss to their advantage (see Fig. 3c). A second way
to implement the dishonest strategy is to have the source create
the non-ideal three-qubit GHZ state for the honest parties and
the dishonest party hold an unentangled photon. This results in a
four-party non-GME state with reduced noise—as the dephasing
from the entangled pair of the second PCF is no longer present26.
We perform the y-protocol with this better-quality resource state
and see that the pass probability increases from 0.669±0.005 to
0.698±0.008 for the no loss case and remains higher when loss is
included (see Fig. 4). Note that despite the second strategy having
higher pass probabilities, these are still below the GME bound
shown in Fig. 3c (upper purple curve).
The comparison of the two strategies shows that the projection
method is not necessarily optimal for the dishonest party due to
phase noise in the experimental state. Note also that as the pass
probability of the experimental state in the honest case (dotted
purple line in Fig. 3c) is below the GME bound, the Verifier is not
able to verify GME for this four-party setting for any amount of
loss. Verification of GME is achieved in our experiment only in
the three-party setting. However, four-party verification could be
achieved using experimental states with higher fidelities, and even
with our non-ideal three-party GHZ state, we have been able to
provide the first proof-of-principle demonstration of our GME
verification protocol.
Discussion
The results we have presented are situated in a realistic context of
distributed communication over photonic quantum networks: we
have shown that it is possible for a party in such a network to
verify the presence of GME in a shared resource, even when some
of the parties are not trusted, including the source of the resource
itself. This distrustful setting sets particularly stringent conditions
on what can be shown in practice. With our state-of-the-art
optical setup that produces high-fidelity three- and four-photon
GHZ states, we were able to show, for the three-party case, that
this verification process is possible using a carefully constructed
protocol, for up to 5% loss, under the most strict security
conditions. Clearly, the loss tolerance of the system can be further
improved by using states with even higher fidelities. This would
also enable the implementation of the verification protocols for a
larger number of qubits.
It is important to remark that our verification protocols
go beyond merely detecting entanglement; they also link the
outcome of the verification tests to the state that is actually used
by the honest parties of the network with respect to their ideal
target state. This is non trivial and of great importance in a
realistic setting where such resources are subsequently used by
the parties in distributed computation and communication
applications executed over the network. Such applications may
also require multipartite entangled states other than the GHZ
states studied in this work. We expect that our verification
protocols should indeed be applicable to other types of useful
states such as, for instance, stabilizer states.
Data availability. All relevant data are available from the authors.
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